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REPLY
Meta-Blackmail and the Evidentiary Theory: Still
Taking Motives Seriously
MITCHELL N. BERMAN*
The law ordinarily permits us to conditionally threaten what it permits us to
do. It also ordinarily prohibits us from conditionally threatening what it prohibits us to do. Sometimes, however, the law prohibits us from conditionally
threatening what it permits us to do.1 This we call blackmail. For generations
the challenge of explaining why this should be—why or how, and under what
circumstances, it can be wrong to threaten what it is not wrong to do—has
constituted one of the great intellectual puzzles in all of law.
Now comes Russell Christopher promising to deepen the puzzle further.2
His tool is a characteristically clever thought experiment or imaginary
device: the conditional threat to conditionally threaten what it is permissible
to do. Dubbing this conditional threat to blackmail “meta-blackmail,” Christopher challenges us to figure out how the law should treat it. Logically, he
says, there are only three possibilities.3 What he terms the “formalist”
solution would punish meta-blackmail more severely than the blackmail
proposal upon which the meta-blackmail proposal is predicated; a “functionalist” solution would punish the two proposals the same; and a “substantivist” solution would punish meta-blackmail less severely than its corresponding
blackmail proposal.
The problem is that these three options are not mere logical possibilities.
To the contrary, Christopher argues, each is supported by plausible—even
“compelling”—intuitions.4 Defenders of blackmail’s criminalization thus
confront a trilemma. Because these three solutions are mutually incompatible, the defender must choose one and provide convincing arguments
sufficient to defeat the intuitions that support the other two. Skeptical that
this can be accomplished, Christopher urges that the only way out is to
decriminalize blackmail. If a conditional threat to perform a legal action
* Bernard J. Ward Centennial Professor in Law, The University of Texas at Austin. © 2006, Mitchell
N. Berman. I am grateful to Russell Christopher and the editors of The Georgetown Law Journal for
graciously allowing me this reply, to John Deigh for valuable conversations, and to Daniel Salgado for
helpful research assistance.
1. These remarks about the conditional threat and the act threatened suggest a 2x2 matrix of
possibilities. For sake of completeness, it is perhaps worth mentioning that the fourth box (permissible
to threaten what it is impermissible to do) is likewise occupied. On many accounts, nuclear deterrence
is the paradigmatic example.
2. Russell L. Christopher, Meta-Blackmail, 94 GEO. L.J. 739 (2006).
3. See id. at 769 n.213.
4. See id. at 747.
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were itself legal, then the formalist, functionalist, and substantivist perspectives would unite in support of the obvious conclusion that meta-blackmail
should be legal too.
Meta-blackmail is a delightful conceit, another provocative product of
Christopher’s fertile imagination. But much as I admire Christopher for
birthing it, I do not think it undermines the intuition—widely and deeply
held, as I believe it to be—that some conditional threats to perform legal
acts are properly criminalized. Quite the contrary, consideration of metablackmail does nothing to undermine one of the existing theories of blackmail’s criminalization—namely, the “evidentiary theory” I advanced nearly
a decade ago.5 Or so I shall argue.
I. THE EVIDENTIARY THEORY
Nominally, Meta-Blackmail is divided into five parts. It is more perspicuous, however, to distinguish two. The first, comprising nearly two-thirds of
the Article, is a critical review of the existing theories of blackmail. After all
are found wanting, the second part sets off to deepen the blackmail puzzle
by introducing the concept of meta-blackmail. Christopher kindly includes
my own effort to solve the blackmail puzzle among those he canvasses.6 But
it appears from his brief discussion that he does not quite understand the
account I offer. So before I explain why Christopher’s three specific objections to the evidentiary theory do not stick, I will offer readers a much fuller
explication of that theory than the single-paragraph summary Christopher
provides.
Recall Christopher’s taxonomy of theories that purport to explain or
justify blackmail’s criminalization. Following convention, his first cut divides consequentialist from nonconsequentialist approaches. He then subdivides the nonconsequentialist theories of blackmail’s criminalization into
two subcategories: those that locate the wrongfulness of the conditional
proposal in one of its components (either the threat or the demand), and
those that locate its wrongfulness in a combination of components. He
classifies my evidentiary theory among the latter, along with George Fletcher’s “domination” theory7 and James Lindgren’s “bargaining chip” theory.8
The subcategory is then rounded out with a fourth type of theory that
Christopher labels “coercion.”9 Citing Lindgren and Jeffrie Murphy with
approval, Christopher suggests that if (contrary to his ultimate conclusion) a
satisfactory justification for blackmail’s criminalization is to emerge, it will

5. Mitchell N. Berman, The Evidentiary Theory of Blackmail: Taking Motives Seriously, 65 U. CHI.
L. REV. 795 (1998) [hereinafter Berman, The Evidentiary Theory].
6. Christopher, supra note 2, at 766–67.
7. Id. at 764–66.
8. Id. at 767–68.
9. Id. at 768–69.
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likely be one that shows blackmail to be coercive: “If blackmail’s prohibition is to rest on coercion, then what is needed (but which is lacking) is an
account of coercion that includes blackmail as coercive but excludes permissible economic transactions.”10
The evidentiary theory is precisely such an account: it explicitly purports to
explain why blackmail is coercive and why ordinary economic transactions are
not.11 I emphasize this not to imply that the evidentiary theory’s status as a
coercion-based theory of blackmail necessarily counts in its favor, let alone
suffices to render it correct. It is, of course, entirely fair to question whether my
account succeeds in establishing both that blackmail is coercive and that hard
economic bargains are not. But Christopher’s failure to properly classify my
account casts doubt on his grasp of its logic.12
A. THE THEORY

Coercion is a species of wrong.13 According to the most common view,
which I share, coercion is the particular wrong that consists in the conditional
threat to commit a wrong.14 This understanding of coercion holds true in any
normative system or from any normative perspective. That is to say: (1) it is
presumptively morally wrong to conditionally threaten what it is presumptively
morally wrong to do; (2) it is presumptively criminally wrong to conditionally
threaten what it is presumptively criminally wrong to do; (3) it is presumptively
unconstitutional to conditionally threaten what it would be presumptively unconstitutional to do; etc.
It is definitional of the crime that the act a blackmailer threatens is not illegal
or, at the least, is not criminal.15 As Christopher observes, whether the act
threatened is illegal is precisely what distinguishes robbery and extortion on the

10. Id. at 769.
11. See Berman, The Evidentiary Theory, supra note 5, at 851–52, 855–56; see also Mitchell N.
Berman, The Normative Functions of Coercion Claims, 8 LEGAL THEORY 45, 81–82 (2002) [hereinafter
Berman, Coercion Claims].
12. This oversight of Christopher’s is especially puzzling given that he entertains the possibility that
Leo Katz’s theory of blackmail might be based on coercion despite Katz’s own apparent protestation to
the contrary. See Christopher, supra note 2, at 768 at n.208. Other than Katz’s, the only “notable
attempts to establish blackmail as coercive” that Christopher identifies are attempts that even the
authors themselves seem to acknowledge fail. See id. at 769 n.210 (citing works by Alan Wertheimer
and Robert Nozick).
13. That is not all coercion is. Not only do we employ coercion talk in a variety of non-normative
contexts, but we employ it to serve two discrete normative functions: to mark a wrong and to excuse
conduct undertaken in the face of certain types of pressure. I have argued elsewhere that what
constitutes coercion for these two purposes differs. See generally Berman, Coercion Claims, supra note
11. I am here concerned only with coercion as a wrong.
14. It might be more precise to conceive of coercion as the wrong of conditionally threatening to
wrong the person threatened. To conform with the space constraints allotted this reply, I will ignore this
nuance and others like it that do not bear significantly either on the adequacy of the evidentiary account
of blackmail, or on my critique of Christopher’s analysis of meta-blackmail.
15. This is a second subtlety that I, like Christopher, ignore for the sake of brevity. I will assume that
the act a blackmailer threatens is neither criminal nor otherwise illegal.
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one hand from blackmail on the other.16 It follows that blackmail cannot
constitute the legal wrong of coercion. But that does not resolve whether
blackmail constitutes the moral wrong of coercion. I argue that it does (at least
in its paradigmatic instances). I argue further that blackmail’s status as a form of
(morally wrongful) coercion can explain and justify its criminalization.
Of these two steps, the former is both more interesting and more difficult.
That is not to say that the latter is unworthy of comment or reflection, for not all
moral wrongs are properly criminalized. But if we can agree that the blackmail
threat is (ordinarily) an instance of the moral wrong of coercion, I venture that
at least a prima facie case for its criminalization will be obvious to just about
everyone, regardless of the theory or theories of punishment to which they
adhere. After all, the blackmailer aims to get something from his victim (usually
money) in a morally illegitimate way. Preventing a (morally) forced transfer of
this sort would seem to fall squarely within the consequentialist objectives of
the criminal law. And if blackmail is a moral wrong, then the retributive case for
its criminalization is also well within our grasp. Furthermore, insofar as blackmail is widely perceived to be morally wrong, then we have an expressive
reason to criminalize it. We could, but need not, go on.
The difficult task, to repeat, is to establish that blackmail constitutes the
moral wrong of coercion. Recall my claim that a conditional proposal is
coercive, morally speaking, if and only if the act threatened would be wrong,
morally speaking, to carry out.17 It follows that if a given instance of blackmail
is morally coercive then the act the blackmailer threatens must be morally
wrongful. This is the difficulty for my account, for the acts customarily leveraged into blackmail proposals are generally thought morally permissible. To be
sure, the contours of blackmail, properly so called, are unclear. One who seeks
to explain and justify both the intuition that blackmail is a moral wrong and the
proposition that it is properly criminalized may fairly limit her defense to some
subset of the conduct that plausibly fits within its parameters. It could well be
that only core cases of blackmail are morally wrongful and that, by a process of
unreflective seepage, moral opprobrium has attached unjustifiably to neighboring cases. It could also be that line-drawing difficulties and kindred sorts of
administrative considerations rightly counsel that the law reach some types of
conditional proposals that might not or do not constitute blackmail, morally
speaking, but cannot be easily excluded from the criminal ban. But these
possibilities are of no help to me, for my claim that the act a blackmailer
threatens is morally wrongful confronts difficulty not just at the periphery but at

16. Christopher, supra note 2, at 745.
17. My reference to “the act threatened” should not drive you to wonder whether blackmail really is
a threat as opposed to an offer. In a biconditional proposal, the proposal-maker is always advancing
both a “threat” (to tell your wife, to shoot you dead, to withhold a good or service) and an “offer” (to
remain silent, to let you live, to provide the good or service). Which of the two labels attaches more
felicitiously to the proposal as a whole is a separate question that need not distract us. See Berman,
Coercion Claims, supra note 11, at 55–59.
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the core. The central case of blackmail, Christopher and I agree,18 includes a
conditional threat to reveal that the recipient of the threat has committed
adultery. Let us then take the following case as representative of blackmail’s
core: A conditionally threatens H to disclose the fact of H’s infidelity to H’s
spouse, W, unless H pays A $10,000. If this proposal is coercive, morally
speaking, then A’s subsequent disclosure of H’s infidelity, on H’s nonpayment to
A, must be morally wrongful. But that, we think, is mistaken. Surely it is
morally permissible for A to do as he threatens. Indeed, some might think that A
should tell W, perhaps is even morally obligated to do so.
The superficial implausibility of contending flatly that A’s disclosure to W
would be morally wrongful has led many theorists to locate the moral wrongfulness of A’s conduct in the threat itself, as opposed to the act threatened. The
evidentiary theory contends otherwise. Its core insight is that the moral character of A’s conduct in disclosing H’s infidelity to W is not a function merely of
what we often call “objective” facts. Rather, the wrongfulness vel non of A’s
disclosure depends on A’s actual motivating reasons for so acting. Of the actions
that a blackmailer threatens, most strike us as morally indeterminate in the sense
that we recognize moral reasons both for and against.19 Under these circumstances, the morality of the choice depends upon the reasons for which one
actually acts, not the reasons that bear on how one should act—what Razians
call the actor’s explanatory reasons, rather than the guiding reasons.20 And the
fact of a prior conditional offer of silence is evidence (not conclusive) that the
blackmailer would not in fact be motivated by right reasons were he to do as he
threatens. The conditional threat does not, accordingly, make the proposal
wrongful. Rather, it tends to reveal the wrongfulness of the act threatened. And
if the act threatened would be wrongful, because not rightly motivated, then the
wrongfulness of the conditional threat follows unproblematically from the logic
of coercion.
This account depends critically upon two propositions: first, that the wrongfulness of an act can depend upon an actor’s motives; and second, that, in the
context of such paradigmatic cases of blackmail as the conditional threat to
disclose the victim’s adultery, the conditional offer of silence is reasonable
evidence (i.e., of nontrivial probative weight) in support of the proposition that
the actor would have the wrong sorts of motives—or, more precisely, would
lack the right sort—were he subsequently to engage in the act threatened.
Admittedly, the first proposition is contested. Indeed, the conventional view
in ethics is that act evaluations like right and wrong are motive-independent and

18. See Berman, The Evidentiary Theory, supra note 5, at 821; Christopher, supra note 2, at 743–44.
19. If the balance of moral reasons clearly weighs against the act, then the moral coerciveness of the
conditional threat is plain. Such cases raise the question of why the law does not prohibit the
unconditional act, but this is rarely a very deep puzzle. A range of considerations—from difficulties of
proof to free-speech concerns—might serve, singly or in combination, to supply an answer.
20. See generally JOSEPH RAZ, On Reasons for Action, ch. 1 of PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS
(Princeton Univ. Press 1990) (1975).
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that motives are relevant only to agent evaluations. With others,21 I think that is
just mistaken, but I cannot fully defend that view in this space. So let me put the
claim another way by breaking the big idea of wrong into the possibly more
manageable component ideas of harm and justification. Let us say—and this
must be to a first approximation only—that it is wrong to knowingly cause harm
without justification.
What sorts of disutilities rightly qualify as “harms”—how to distinguish
between genuine harms and merely putative harms—is controversial. But that
the answer depends on some form of normative or evaluative judgment, not a
bare descriptive one, is common ground. Suppose that A punches B in the arm
and that C refuses to go with D to the prom. Very plausibly, D will suffer more
keenly from C’s refusal than B will suffer from A’s punch. Nonetheless, B is
thought to suffer harm while D does not, the upshot being that A is thereby
obligated to provide reasons for his conduct, while C is not. No doubt we can
give reasons to defend this two-part conclusion.22 For purposes of resolving the
blackmail puzzle, though, I think it unnecessary to delve deeper. Whatever the
precise bases of contemporary moral judgments regarding what types of setbacks do and do not constitute harm, that disclosing someone’s infidelity to his
or her spouse causes the adulterer what society deems a harm seems hard to
deny. The disclosure infringes morally recognized interests in privacy and
reputation. That the adulterer’s previously good reputation might not have been
deserved, that he might richly deserve to suffer from the disclosure, is not to the
point. Were the justifiability of imposing a badness sufficient to render the
badness not a harm, then the notion that a harm might have been imposed
justifiably would be incoherent, which it is not.23 If B, acting in self-defense,
forcibly repels an unprovoked attack by A, causing A injury, we would not, in
response to a subsequent complaint by A, assert that B did not harm A. Rather,
because B acted with justification, the mere fact that A was harmed leaves him
with no grounds for complaint.

21. See Steven Sverdlik, Motive and Rightness, 106 ETHICS 327 (1996) (arguing that motives can
affect the “rightness” or “wrongness” of an action).
22. Following Jeffrie Murphy, Christopher asserts that such reasons would have to make use of the
concept of a right. Christopher, supra note 2, at 765–66 (citing Jeffrie G. Murphy, Blackmail: A
Preliminary Inquiry, 63 MONIST 156, 161 (1980)). I am disposed to believe, in contrast, that the idea of
a right may, but need not, feature in a satisfactory account of the moral concept of harm.
23. I thus disagree with Joel Feinberg’s suggestion that “[t]o say that A has harmed B in this
[normative] sense is to say much the same thing as that A has wronged B” and that “[o]ne person
wrongs another when his indefensible (unjustifiable and inexcusable) conduct violates the other’s
right.” 1 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO OTHERS 34 (1984). Feinberg
is surely correct that “not all invasions of interest are wrongs, since some actions invade another’s
interests excusably or justifiably, or invade interests that the other has no right to have respected.” Id. at
35. But precisely because there exist these two ways that an invasion of interest is prevented from
constituting a wrong, it would be helpful to have a vocabulary adequate to capture the difference. A
first-pass characterization of wrong as the knowing risking of harm without justification allows us to
say that not all invasions of interests are wrongs since some invasions constitute no harm and some
harms are excused or justified.
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So I hope we can agree that when disclosing H’s infidelity to W, A harms H,
in a morally significant sense. (I will argue later24 that such a disclosure
produces legally cognizable harm as well, but the evidentiary theory does not
depend upon that stronger claim.) The second question is whether A acts with or
without justification. In answering this question, three things are potentially
relevant—the objective facts, the actor’s beliefs, and the actor’s motivations.25
Criminal theorists are divided over whether an actor can be justified (as opposed
to merely excused) if he mistakenly believes that facts obtain which would
unproblematically confer justification were the beliefs true. But, regardless of
whether the actor’s beliefs in the justifying facts must be true or merely genuine
(and reasonable), most agree that, in order to render the actor morally justified,
those beliefs must form part of what motivates him.26 Because A knowingly
causes H harm when disclosing to W, he acts wrongly27 in doing so unless he is
actually motivated by one or more of some relatively small number of beliefs
and values—things like a belief that W has a right to the truth or that the
knowledge would likely help W make life decisions that better promote her
interests and welfare. If A makes the disclosure so that H will suffer, or on a
lark, or because he had threatened to do so and now wants to develop a
reputation as a credible threatener, or because C had offered A $100 to tell W,
then A acts without justification and therefore wrongly. It is not that A necessarily has “bad motives” such as spite or malice, but that he lacks good motives
and that one must act for good motives when knowingly risking harm.28

24. See infra note 32.
25. For a recent elaboration, see Mitchell N. Berman, Lesser Evils and Justification: A Less Close
Look, 24 LAW & PHIL. 681 (2005).
26. See, e.g., John Gardner, Justifications and Reasons, in HARM AND CULPABILITY 103, 107–14 (A.P.
Smith & A.T.H. Simester eds., 1996) (arguing that, to be justified, the guiding reasons for taking a
particular course of action must be among the explanatory reasons for having taken it). Although I
agree with Gardner that right motivations are necessary to confer moral justification, I disagree with his
position that right motivations, along with nonculpable beliefs, are not jointly sufficient. But that is a
separate matter, as is whether right motivations are or should be necessary to confer legal justification
under the general defense of necessity.
27. Our language is sufficiently nuanced to allow us to describe A’s disclosure in various ways.
Those who insist that the rightness or wrongness of an action is independent of the actor’s reasons or
motives for engaging in that action may nonetheless allow that by virtue of his failure to be rightly
motivated, “A’s action was not wrong, but he nonetheless acted wrongly” or that “A acted wrongfully
but did not engage in wrongdoing,” or something of this sort. I do not want to fight those battles here.
Instead, I propose to amend my definition of coercion to accommodate whatever description of A’s
conduct in making his disclosure that would render the conditional threat to make that disclosure, under
that description, the wrong of coercion. That is, for example, if the best characterization of A’s
not-well-motivated disclosure of H’s infidelity is that “A acted wrongly in doing right,” then let us say
that coercion is the wrong of threatening either to do wrong or to act wrongly in doing what is not
wrong.
28. Christopher describes my account as one based on the presence of “bad motives.” I cannot fault
him for that, as I used that description myself at times. But I did so as a shorthand, specifically defining
“bad motives” as knowingly risking harm without good motives. See Berman, The Evidentiary Theory,
supra note 5, at 839–40, 848. This is an important distinction because the claim that, were he to engage
in the disclosure he threatens, a blackmailer is apt to have a pro attitude toward the bad, is rather

794

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 94:787

This is all enough to conclude that A wrongs H in disclosing H’s infidelity to
W if and only if A does not act for the right reasons. The final question is
whether the conditional threat is evidence that were A to disclose, his motivating reasons would in fact not be the right ones. Surely yes. Rightly or wrongly,
most people mind their own business. Reasonably, then, Christopher suggests at
one point that one who informs someone about the infidelity of the latter’s
spouse may be a friend.29 Certainly, bonds of friendship might motivate such a
disclosure. But bonds of friendship could also, in at least two ways, motivate
silence. First, and especially if the friend believes that learning the truth will
not, in fact, cause the wronged spouse to engineer an improvement in her
marital relationship, the friend might conclude that her greater duty is to avoid
causing W unnecessary pain. Second, the friend of one spouse might well be the
friend of the other as well, and hence feel conflicting obligations of loyalty.
All of this explains why people who discover information about a friend’s
infidelity are likely to feel so deeply torn and to reason that the proper path (to
tell the wronged spouse or to remain silent or to confront the adulterer) depends
on a host of factors: the history and character of his friendship with each
spouse; whether the infidelity was a single incident or a longer affair; whether,
if the latter, the affair has been terminated or remains ongoing; whether the
offending spouse appears genuinely repentant; whether the wronged spouse is
likely to use the information in a way that is productive for her (including by
dissolving the marriage) or to experience the information as gratuitously painful; etc. It is also why the innocent spouse who comes to believe that her friend
chose wrongly (spoke when she would have preferred not to know or remained
silent when she would rather have learned the truth) can nonetheless accept that
her friend is her friend, that he acted consistent with the duty, born of friendship, to act with loving regard for her interests. What appears inconsistent with
the duties of friendship is for the putative friend to have offered to sell the
offending spouse his silence. So if A tells W after having made a blackmail
proposal to H which H rebuffed, it seems highly unlikely that A is, at the time of
disclosure, actually motivated by friendship with W.30 Had A concluded that, all
stronger than the claim that he is apt to lack a pro attitude toward the good. The evidentiary account
relies on the latter, weaker claim.
29. See Christopher, supra note 2, at 763 (“[A]s a friend to a cuckolded spouse, it is morally
permissible to disclose the other’s spouse’s infidelity.”).
30. Naturally, much depends upon what A demanded as the price for his silence. The argument in
text assumes that A demands that H pay A money. Had A instead conditionally threatened to tell W
unless H immediately broke off his affair with B, then the hypothesis that (when making the disclosure
upon H’s noncompliance with the demand) A would be motivated by friendship to W would be
bolstered rather than undermined. There exist a range of intermediate cases in which the strength of the
evidentiary inference is debatable or unclear.
This analysis suggests a (large) kernel of truth behind Lindgren’s “bargaining chip” theory. See id. at
767–68. See generally James Lindgren, Unraveling the Paradox of Blackmail, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 670,
702 (1984). It is not that there exists a general moral duty not to exploit other people’s interests for your
benefit. It is that such exploitation is likely inconsistent with having a certain status (like friend)
vis-à-vis the person whose “chips” they are, and that the hypothesis that one had the motives adequate
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things considered, his duty of friendship militated in favor of disclosure, he
would not have offered to remain silent for payment.31
Of course, the assumption that A is, or claims to be, W’s friend helps illustrate
the evidentiary analysis, but is not essential. The more general point is that
whenever A discloses an embarrassing secret of B’s, an objective factfinder
whose job it was to determine whether A’s motives were good would find it
probative to learn that, prior to the disclosure, A had offered to sell B his
silence. The factfinder would want evidence of the prior conditional threat to be
admissible, so to speak.
In summary, and generalizing from the case of adultery-blackmail to conditional threats to disclose embarrassing information, the evidentiary explanation
for the criminalization of blackmail rests on the following eight steps: (1) it is
morally coercive to conditionally threaten what it would be morally wrong to
do; (2) it is morally wrong to knowingly cause (or risk) harm without justification; (3) it is a necessary condition for the realization of a justification that the
facts that could support the justification be among (or prominent among) the
explanatory reasons for which an actor acts; (4) the sense of harm at work here
is moralized (or at least evaluative); (5) absent unusual circumstances, disclosing an embarrassing secret about an individual causes what our culture recognizes as harm (in the morally relevant sense); (6) the fact that, prior to making
such a harm-causing disclosure, the actor had conditionally offered his silence
for a fee is ordinarily evidence of nontrivial probative value that, when subsequently making the disclosure, the reasons that could supply justification were
not among the actor’s explanatory reasons; (7) therefore, blackmail proposals
predicated on a threat to reveal embarrassing secrets are ordinarily (or frequently) morally coercive; and (8) because blackmail proposals predicated on
such threats are ordinarily (or frequently) efforts to obtain property belonging to
another by morally coercive means, society has prima facie reason to criminalize them (even though the criminal ban would cover instances of conduct that
are not morally coercive).32

to justify engaging in the harm-causing disclosure could come close to presupposing that status
relationship.
31. A more-detailed and formal analysis of the evidentiary inference appears in Berman, The
Evidentiary Theory, supra note 5, at 844–48.
32. This presentation of the evidentiary argument follows the relatively modest line taken in
Coercion Claims by treating blackmail as criminalizable because it is coercive in a moral sense. In The
Evidentiary Theory, I took the stronger position that blackmail proposals could be viewed as conditional threats to engage in constructively unlawful conduct, in which case the proposals themselves
could be viewed as constructively coercive in a legal sense. I offer a condensed version of that
argument here for sake of completeness. It bears emphasis, though, that while I still believe this
argument to be correct, it is more aggressive than necessary to solve the blackmail puzzle.
Christopher characterizes what the blackmailer threatens (in central cases) as “the act of disclosing
another’s embarrassing secret.” Christopher, supra note 2, at 71. Let us label the act-type of disclosing
an embarrassing secret D. D can be broken into various act-subtypes. Consider two to start: the
act-subtypes of disclosing embarrassing secrets after having made a prior conditional offer of silence
(DCO), and of disclosing embarrassing secrets without having made a prior conditional offer of silence
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This is a sketch of the evidentiary analysis of central-case blackmail. Whether
the evidentiary analysis likewise justifies the criminalization of other conditional threats (involving conditional demands other than the payment of money
and/or involving threats to engage in lawful activities other than the disclosure
of a person’s infidelity) depends, in the first instance, both on whether the
conduct threatened would cause harm (in the morally relevant sense) and on the
strength of the evidentiary inference captured by proposition (6). Some conditional threats that are candidates to be labeled blackmail will thus appear to be
morally coercive—some will not. How, finally, the law ought to respond is yet a
further question. Because of concerns of a practical or administrative nature, we
should expect that the optimal legal solution would likely involve both the
criminalization of some conditional threats that are not morally coercive and the
noncriminalization of some conditional threats that are.33

(DNCO). These two subtypes are jointly exhaustive of act-type D, for every act-token (d) that falls within
D is also a token either of DCO or DNCO. With this refinement, we can say that the act-type a blackmailer
threatens is not simply D, but rather DCO. As the conditional threat to engage in DCO, we can
denominate blackmail itself CT-DCO.
Now notice a second way of subdividing D—between the act-subtype of disclosing embarrassing
secrets with good motives (DGM) and the act-subtype of disclosing embarrassing secrets without good
motives (DNGM). Just like the subtypes DCO and DNCO, DGM and DNGM are also jointly exhaustive of D. I
take it that, First Amendment considerations aside, DNGM can be criminalized consistent with basic
principles of Anglo-American criminal law, which is essentially to say that the harm that DNGM
produces is not only morally cognizable but legally cognizable too. (In The Evidentiary Theory, I offer
both theoretical and historical reasons in support of this claim. The historical support, very briefly, is
that for much of the nation’s history, DNGM was a crime. Until the Supreme Court’s decision in Garrison
v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964) (holding that the First Amendment prohibits the prosecution of alleged
libels absent proof of knowing or reckless falsehood, when such publications relate to public affairs), a
majority of states, by constitution or statute, provided that a valid defense to a criminal libel
prosecution required the defendant to establish not only the truth of the libelous publication but that it
was actually published with good motives. See id. at 70–72 & n.7. And if DNGM were a crime, then the
conditional threat to DNGM (call this CT-DNGM) would be coercive legally speaking and would constitute
an unproblematic instance of robbery or extortion.
But a central insight of the evidentiary theory—represented by proposition (6)—is, in effect, that DCO
is an imperfect but fair proxy for DNGM. So instead of criminalizing DNGM and CT-DNGM, the state might
sensibly choose to criminalize DCO and CT-DCO. Were the law to do so, we would have achieved what
Christopher deems “the holy grail of blackmail scholarship—the identification of an independently
unlawful component of blackmail.” Christopher, supra note 2, at 19. But we do not need to criminalize
DCO and CT-DCO. Criminalizing CT-DCO alone does all the work.
33. Two other aspects of the evidentiary analysis are worth noting. First, only step (8) addresses why
blackmail should be criminalized; the first seven steps tackle the more fundamental puzzle of explaining why blackmail is morally wrongful. As Christopher observes, the most common argument for
blackmail’s decriminalization is libertarian. Christopher, supra note 2, at 743 n.21. But the libertarian
scholars who press this case rarely challenge the widespread, almost universal, judgment that blackmail
is morally wrongful. Indeed, they often concede the moral wrongfulness of the practice and argue only
that it is an immorality with which the state should not be concerned. See, e.g., Walter Block, The Case
for De-Criminalizing Blackmail: A Reply to Lindgren and Campbell, 24 W. ST. U. L. REV. 225, 225–26
(1997). Perhaps this is right. But it is unsettling that this position leaves the heart of the puzzle on the
table: why should it be morally wrongful to conditionally threaten what it is not morally wrongful to
do? The evidentiary analysis explains not only why the criminal law treats blackmail the way it does,
but why conventional morality does too.
Second, although the evidentiary theory explains both why central-case blackmail is a moral wrong
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B. CHRISTOPHER ’S CRITICISMS

Christopher raises three criticisms of the evidentiary approach. According to
him, my theory (1) “fails to establish that [blackmail] constitutes an impermissible harm”; (2) “fails to distinguish blackmail from permissible transactions”;
and (3) “is underinclusive in failing to explain why blackmail for good motives
is nonetheless punished.”34 Individually and collectively, these criticisms miss
the mark.
The first two objections are two sides of the same coin. I am thought to need,
but lack, a theory of harm35 pursuant to which two things are true: (1) blackmail
proposals threaten it, and (2) hard commercial bargains, extending even to cases
like Jeffrie Murphy’s famous Baseball case, do not.36
Christopher emphasizes that harm is a moral concept. As already explained, I
agree: harm is a setback to a normatively recognized interest. (From a legal
perspective, harm is a setback to a legally recognized interest; from a moral
perspective, it is a setback to a morally recognized interest.) Indeed, I am
disposed to think that the principal significance of the moralized concept of
harm is functional—it marks the type of setback to interests the causing of
which, if done by a moral agent, imposes a demand of reason-giving. It follows
that what counts as a harm in any given culture is contingent. The content given
to the concept of harm, or its extension, will likely vary depending on the
underlying theory of the good.
As it happens, in our time and place, prevailing moral judgments recognize
an individual’s interest in her reputation, as well as a privacy interest in
maintaining personal secrets. At the same time, they do not recognize an interest
in property owned and possessed by others. To make this concrete, suppose

and why it is properly made a criminal wrong, it does not address how grave or serious a moral or legal
wrong it is. On the question of gravity, it is certainly relevant that the repetitive nature of blackmail
causes frustration, anxiety, even fear. Cf. George P. Fletcher, Blackmail: The Paradigmatic Crime, 141
U. PA. L. REV. 1617, 1626–39 (1993) (emphasizing that the fact that blackmailers can and often do
repeat their demands places their victims in positions of subordination). Put in Christopher’s terms,
there are plausible constructions of “seriousness” in which blackmail is more serious than the act it
threatens even if carrying out the act would be wrongful—indeed, even were the act threatened
criminalizable. See supra note 32.
34. Christopher, supra note 2, at 765–67.
35. Christopher says that I need a theory of “wrongful” or “impermissible” harm. But the nomenclature is not important. The critical point is that not all injuries, deprivations, disutilities or setbacks that
are sometimes called “harms” count as harms in the morally relevant sense. Whereas Christopher
would mark this distinction by applying qualifiers like wrongful or impermissible to those harms that
are morally significant, I prefer to reserve the unmodified term “harm” for the morally significant types
of setback, and apply such qualifiers as “putative” or “claimed” to the others. This is quite literally a
nominal difference; nothing of substance turns on it. Even if we adopt Christopher’s terms, however, I
do not claim that blackmail “constitutes an impermissible harm.” Id. at 765 (emphasis added). Key to
the evidentiary theory is the claim that blackmail threatens (impermissible) harm.
36. See id. at 751. In the Baseball case, it is supposed that possession of a Babe Ruth-autographed
baseball will bring happiness to a dying boy whose final days would otherwise be filled entirely with
misery, that the baseball’s owner offers to sell it to the boy’s parents for all of their money, and
(implicitly) that the price demanded is far above what the market would bring.
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these several things are true of M: he likes to wear women’s undergarments and
very much wishes this not to become publicly known; he also takes great
pleasure in viewing an outdoor sculpture displayed in his neighbors’ yard. One
day, M’s neighbor N does two things: he throws out the sculpture, and also
reveals M’s embarrassing secret at a neighborhood party. Both actions by N set
back interests of M’s—his interest in viewing the sculpture, and his interest in
maintaining privacy or reputation. M might experience both setbacks as harms.
But society does not. The prevailing social judgment is that N harmed M by
disclosing M’s transvestism but that N did not harm M when junking his (N’s)
sculpture. This is true even if M felt the latter to be more disagreeable or painful
and even if we know that M views his interests this way. Functionally, this view
of which interests do and do not count (morally speaking), and therefore of
which felt injuries qualify as harms (morally speaking), entails that N is morally
obligated to provide reasons for the one action—disclosing M’s secret—but not
for the other—junking his own sculpture. In other words, if all N can say to
explain either action is “I just felt like it,” he will be adjudged to have acted
wrongfully in the former case but not in the latter. These are socially and
historically contingent facts; our valuations could be different and might yet
be.37
It should be apparent, then, that my account rests both on a conceptual claim
about what harm means, and on an empirical claim about the content of the
category of harm in our particular culture. Christopher agrees with my conceptual claim, and I discern no basis for suspecting that he disagrees with the
empirical one. His objection, then, appears to be that I do not advance a
normative account that justifies these judgments: I do not show that the prevailing judgments that (1) disclosing embarrassing secrets does cause harm, and (2)
refusing to part with, and even destroying, property belonging to oneself does
not, are correct. This is true. And it would be folly to attempt the effort in this
brief space. Take the evidentiary account, therefore, as a conditional justification of the law of blackmail: Taking as a given these collective moral judgments, central-case secret-disclosure blackmail is properly considered morally
coercive and central-case hard bargains are properly considered not morally
37. For respects in which the American conception of privacy differs from the conception that
prevails in France and Germany, see James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity
Versus Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151 (2004). For changing views in the United States regarding one’s
right to destroy one’s own property, see Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right To Destroy, 114 YALE L.J.
781 (2005).
The Baseball hypothetical, see supra note 36, presents arguably a borderline case even under
contemporary norms because of the character and intensity of the offerees’ interest in the property that
the baseball owner threatens to withhold. It is not crazy to characterize the owner’s refusal to part with
the ball as harmful to the dying child and his parents, which is why we would consider it a plausible
complaint, I think, were the parents to denounce the baseball owner’s proposal as “blackmail.” At the
same time, though, we would understand that the parents would be using the word in its moral—as
opposed to legal—sense, and we would also appreciate the practical imperatives, in our capitalist
society, against making such instances of morally coercive proposals criminal. See Berman, The
Evidentiary Theory, supra note 5, at 855–56.
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coercive.
Christopher’s third objection is beset by a confusion regarding the discrete
acts with respect to which the actor’s motives are thought to matter. Every
blackmail proposal implicates three actions: the action of communicating the
proposal itself (“I will tell your spouse if and only if you don’t pay me”), the
action that is threatened (telling the spouse), and the action that is offered
(remaining silent). The motives of interest to the evidentiary theory are those for
the act threatened.38 The theory says that were the actor to engage in that
behavior without good motives, he would be acting wrongfully. It says further
that the communicating of the conditional proposal is some (defeasible) evidence that he would in fact lack good motives for performing the act threatened,
and that, under such circumstances, the conditional proposal is a conditional
threat to do wrong, and hence constitutes the moral wrong of coercion.
Now consider Christopher’s objection that the account seems unable to
explain or justify punishing those who engage in “blackmail for good motives,”
such as a “Robin Hood of blackmailers.” Although Christopher is a little
telegraphic here, I suppose he has in mind someone who collects embarrassing
or scandalous information about wealthy folks and threatens them with disclosure unless paid for silence. But instead of keeping the proceeds for himself, he
distributes them to the poor, elderly, or infirm. Given his good motives for
engaging in blackmail, Christopher reasons, a motive-based account should be
unable to justify punishing him.
But this objection rests on a mistake. The motives that matter in my analysis,
I have explained, are the motives one has, or would have, when engaging in the
act threatened. The good motives harbored by the Robin Hood of blackmailers,
in contrast, are those that drive him to engage in the blackmail. But notwithstanding those good motives, we are still permitted to infer that, were Robin’s
wealthy victim to refuse his demand, and were Robin then to carry out his
threat, he would not then be animated by reasons adequate to justify him in
knowingly causing harm. And assuming that he would act wrongfully in
carrying out the threat, he engages in the wrong of coercion when making it.
True, that need not be the end of the inquiry. For even if the Robin Hood of
blackmailers is engaged in the presumptive moral wrong of coercion, there is a
separate question whether he might be able to justify this presumptive wrongdoing, all things considered. It is at this stage that his good motives could become
legally relevant. They could, but they needn’t. To see why, forget about Christopher’s imagined Robin Hood of blackmailers and think instead about a Robin
Hood of robbers. Call him, well, Robin Hood. Robin Hood says that he has
good reasons for conditionally threatening to injure or kill his wealthy victims.
The law could view those reasons as conferring justification. But it doesn’t. And

38. That is true for garden-variety blackmail. For blackmail threats to reveal an individual’s criminal
wrongdoing to the proper authorities, the motives of interest are the motives for engaging in the action
offered—namely, remaining silent. See Berman, The Evidentiary Theory, supra note 5, at 860–62.
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the reasons why it does not are rather too obvious to warrant discussion here.
The Robin Hood of blackmailers is in the very same boat.
If Christopher’s example of the Robin Hood of blackmailers misconceives
the details of my account, his example of Max, the malicious gossip, misunderstands the nature of my enterprise.
Think of Max as a split personality, or as three different personae over time.
Max1 is the malicious gossip: he gathers and spreads embarrassing information
for the sheer pleasure of causing his victims to suffer. Max2 is the mercenary
seller of gossip to supermarket tabloids: he gathers and sells the information
because he can make a buck doing so, wholly indifferent to the suffering he
(knowingly) causes. Max3 is the mercenary seller of gossip with a heart: he
(sometimes) offers to remain silent if his victim will pay what the tabloid
would. Whereas Max1 is motivated by malice and Max2 is motivated by callous
indifference, Max3’s indifference is tempered by some compassion for the
suffering of his victims. (Not too much compassion, mind you: he does not
choose to steer clear of the gossip-mongering business entirely.) Of the three,
accordingly, Max3 seems the least blameworthy. Yet Max3 will be punished for
blackmail while his two alter egos go free. And that, Christopher thinks, cannot
be right.
Well, who says that Max3 should be punished? Am I supposed to think so?
Christopher seems to assume that because the law of most jurisdictions would
count this as blackmail, any theoretical defense of blackmail’s criminalization
must likewise. But this is an entirely unjustified assumption, for it simply
misunderstands the central-case method of analysis in which I have been
engaged.39 A theorist who employs that method—which strikes me as the only
sensible strategy for resolving the blackmail puzzle—starts by seeking to
explain or justify the central case. If successful, she then asks how that analysis
applies to cases beyond the core. It is always open for the practitioner of this
method to explain why some peripheral cases of the phenomenon under review
appear, from the perspective offered by a new account of the central case, to be
properly subject to different treatment. Accordingly, I think I am entitled to
defang the objection that the Max case presents by agreeing that the law of
blackmail should be revised to exclude market-price blackmail.
In fact, I am not just entitled to do so, I have done so. In The Evidentiary
Theory, I remarked that market-price blackmail presents “one of the most
complex riddles” of all the subordinate or peripheral cases,40 and I devoted
three pages of analysis trying to resolve it. In the end, though I reached no
confident conclusion about whether market-price blackmail should be decriminalized, I did observe that if conditional threats like those issued by Max3 were
to remain criminal, they should nonetheless not be classed as a form of

39. For a discussion of the method, see JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW
(1980).
40. Berman, The Evidentiary Theory, supra note 5, at 857.
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“blackmail.”41 I will not try the reader’s patience by reprising my arguments
here; the interested reader can review them for herself. The important point at
present is that the evidentiary analysis can comfortably accommodate Christopher’s intuitions about the Maxes and the problem of mixed motives.42
II. META-BLACKMAIL
While I am disposed to conclude that Christopher marginally overstates the
case when asserting that nobody has been able to explain “how or why
blackmail should be criminalized,”43 confidence in my conclusion is not yet
justified. Like any account that seeks to justify blackmail’s continued criminalization, the evidentiary theory must face down the meta-blackmail challenge.
Pay careful attention to Christopher’s argumentative strategy. Christopher
does not claim that anybody has ever actually engaged in meta-blackmail.
Presumably, meta-blackmail is solely a product of Christopher’s imagination,
unknown in the wild. Accordingly, it would be odd indeed to suppose that
people will have strong intuitions about how the law should treat metablackmail relative to blackmail—let alone that any such intuitions would exert
sufficient force as to dislodge our intuitions about the actual and culturally
salient practice of blackmail itself. To his credit, Christopher does not suppose
this; he does not appeal to claimed intuitions about meta-blackmail per se.

41. Id. at 859 n.209.
42. In addition to these three explicit criticisms, a theme runs throughout Meta-Blackmail that could
be understood to function as a stand-in, or promissory note, for additional objections. I am thinking of
Christopher’s repeated invocation of a supposed scholarly consensus regarding the infirmity of all
extant theories. See, e.g., Christopher, supra note 2, at 750 (“It is widely acknowledged that no
resolution of the blackmail puzzle has been found acceptable.”); id. at 741 n.6, 742 n.7, 743 n.20 & 745
n.32 (quoting authorities). That refrain, taken together with his assertion that “a number of difficulties”
afflict my theory, id. at 765, might be taken to imply that the three specific criticisms Christopher
adduces are representative, but not exhaustive, of the many reasons scholars have given for finding the
evidentiary theory unsatisfactory. I am not so bold as to claim that the evidentiary theory is immune to
further criticism, that no plausible objections could yet be waiting in the wings. But readers should not
be misled into supposing that the potentially awaiting criticisms are actual, or that they have already
been voiced and found meritorious by the community of criminal law theorists. To be sure, many
authorities have declared that the blackmail puzzle remains unsolved. But all such declarations that
Christopher quotes appeared before publication of the evidentiary theory.
Although criminal theorists had not weighed in on the evidentiary theory prior to Christopher, one
student commentator had. See Ronald J. Scalise, Jr., Comment, Blackmail, Legality, and Liberalism, 74
TUL. L. REV. 1483 (2000). It is safe to say that he was not impressed. While the author adjudges aspects
of my analysis “unclear,” “amorphous,” “puzzling,” “dubious,” “ad hoc,” “cursor[y],” and “unfai[r],”
the account as a whole is said to “assum[e] away the paradox,” to provide “no guidance,” and to “fai[l]
to advance the theoretical ball down the blackmail playing field.” Worse than offering “little insight,”
and transparently “attempt[ing] to provide a crutch to an ailing theory,” in fact the evidentiary account
“only serves to obfuscate.” Notwithstanding these numerous and grave flaws, however, I am generously
credited for a “valiant effort.” Still, readers are firmly warned to steer clear of this “sinister” theory. Id.
at 1491–1501. A second critical review of the evidentiary theory came to the author’s attention just as
this Reply was going to page proofs. See Walter Block, Berman on Blackmail: Taking Motives
Fervently, 3 FLA. ST. U. BUS. REV. 57 (2003).
43. Christopher, supra note 2, at 743.
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Instead, he appeals to more general intuitions, claims that each of them entails a
particular conclusion about how meta-blackmail ought to be treated, and observes that the three conclusions that our intuitions thereby generate are mutually incompatible. The only way to avoid the incompatibility of the resulting
conclusions, Christopher reasons, is to reject some of the intuitions: we can
either reject (at least) two of the intuitions that undergird the formalist, functionalist, and substantivist solutions, or we can reject the single intuition that
blackmail should be criminalized.44 Given this choice, Christopher is confident
in recommending the latter course, for “the intuitions that criminalizing blackmail violates are more compelling than the intuition that blackmail should be
criminalized.”45
Here Christopher errs. There is a way to indulge the intuition that blackmail
should remain a crime and to escape the contradictory conclusions regarding
how meta-blackmail should be treated, while accepting all three intuitions that
undergird the formalist, functionalist, and substantivist perspectives: Deny that
the intuitions entail the conclusions. After all, the relationship between the
contradictory perspectives on meta-blackmail (that it should be treated more
seriously than blackmail, equally seriously, and less seriously) and the intuitions
to which Christopher claims we are attached (functionalist, formalist, and
substantivist) is essentially the syllogistic relationship between conclusion and
major premise. This is represented in the following chart:46
Focus first on the conclusions, not the intuitions. They plainly conflict. Which
if any is correct?
A. TWO CHEERS FOR THE FUNCTIONALIST PERSPECTIVE

At this point, it will pay to have a more concrete pair of blackmail and
meta-blackmail proposals in mind. Adding detail to our earlier example of
central-case blackmail, let us suppose that A conditionally threatens H that
unless H pays A $10,000 within twenty-four hours, A will, at the earliest
opportunity thereafter, disclose the fact of H’s infidelity to H’s spouse, W. As a
concrete representation of blackmail’s core, call this proposal B(c). What—
precisely—is the corresponding meta-blackmail proposal? Christopher does not
quite say, but what I think he has in mind is this: A conditionally threatens H
that unless H immediately pays A $10,000, A will immediately threaten that
unless H pays A $10,000 within twenty-four hours, A will, at the earliest

44. See id. at 784–85.
45. Id. at 743.
46. The various intuitions, factual claims, and conclusions in the chart are not verbatim quotations
from Meta-Blackmail (though often very close). To maintain fidelity with Christopher’s arguments I felt
myself bound by two constraints: first, that the three conclusions are mutually incompatible; and
second, that each of the three intuitions is, at a minimum, plausible and arguably compelling.
47. Id. at 748, 784–85.
48. Id. at 748–49, 775, 784–85.
49. Id. at 748–49, 779, 784–85.
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opportunity thereafter, disclose the fact of H’s infidelity to H’s spouse, W.50 Call
this proposal M-B(c)1.
Whatever might be said of other blackmail and meta-blackmail proposals,
this particular pair—B(c) and M-B(c)1—sure do seem functionally equivalent:
they demand the same amount of money, they threaten the same disclosure, to
the same person, at the same time. Their functional equivalence is further
suggested by the fact that it is hard or impossible to imagine why any real-life A
would ever issue a meta-blackmail threat of this form except as an opportunistic
exploitation of a legal rule that treated this meta-blackmail proposal less
severely than the corresponding blackmail proposal. Accordingly, let us provisionally endorse the functionalist solution and propose that B(c) and M-B(c)1 should
be treated the same.51
50. That the meta-blackmail proposal of Christopher’s imagination demands immediate compliance
is suggested by analogy to his hypothetical meta-robbery proposal, id. at 773 (“If you do not give me
your money, then I will immediately rob you.”), as well as his subsequent construal of meta-blackmail,
id. at 774 (“If you do not give me $1000, then (if you do not give me $1000, then I will disclose your
adulterous relationship).”).
51. Elsewhere, Christopher puts the functionalist intuition differently: “[I]f two differently expressed
proposals both, in effect, propose exchanging the concealment of the same secret in return for the same
amount of money to the same person, the two proposals should be treated equivalently under the
criminal law.” Id. at 747. To this nobody should give assent. Our central case, B(c), is represented by
the following threat, uttered by A to H: “If you don’t pay me $10,000 within twenty-four hours, I will,
at my earliest opportunity thereafter, disclose your infidelity to your wife.” Compare B(c) with these
two variations: “If you don’t pay me $10,000 within twenty-four hours, I will, at my earliest
opportunity thereafter, disclose your infidelity to your barber”; and “If you don’t pay me $10,000 within
ten years, I will, at my earliest opportunity thereafter, disclose your infidelity to your wife.” Compared
with B(c), both variations “propose exchanging the concealment of the same secret in return for the
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This position commits us to deny both that this particular instance of metablackmail should be treated more severely than its corresponding instance of
blackmail (as per the formalist approach), and that it should be treated less
severely (as per the substantivist approach). But as we will see, it does not
commit us to deny the intuitions that ground those two alternative conclusions.
B. ONE CHEER FOR THE SUBSTANTIVIST PERSPECTIVE

The central defect of the substantivist argument is clear, and it has nothing to
do with the substantivist intuition. The substantivist conclusion fails because the
argument’s factual claim is false. The threatened harm of B(c) is the disclosure
of H’s adultery to W. I assume that the harm threatened by the meta-blackmail
proposal is the same harm that the corresponding blackmail proposal threatens.
In the case of M-B(c)1, that threatened harm would be, again, the disclosure of
H’s adultery to W.52 If so, M-B(c)1 and B(c) would then threaten disclosure to
occur at the same time, in which case the harm threatened by the metablackmail proposal is not “more remote” than the threatened harm of B(c).53
The analysis to this point depends heavily on the precise content of the
meta-blackmail that I have supposed to correspond to our paradigmatic blackmail proposal, B(c). But an infinite number of meta-blackmail proposals correspond to, or threaten, B(c). Consider the following possibility, which we can
designate M-B(c)2: A conditionally threatens H that unless H pays A $10,000
within ten years, A will, at the end of that period, immediately threaten that
unless H pays A $10,000 within twenty-four hours, A will, at the earliest
opportunity thereafter, disclose the fact of H’s infidelity to H’s spouse, W.
Unlike the case for M-B(c)1, the harm that M-B(c)2 threatens is more remote
than the harm threatened by its corresponding blackmail proposal, B(c), indeed
considerably so. In other words, the pair of proposals M-B(c)2 and B(c) do
same amount of money to the same person,” but neither is “functionally equivalent” to B(c), and there
is no reason to believe that they should all be treated the same by the criminal law.
52. Alternatively, if less plausibly, the threatened harm of any meta-blackmail proposal is the harm
of being blackmailed. That is, M-B(c)1 threatens the harm of being subject to B(c). If so, then the
threatened harm of M-B(c)1 is less remote than the threatened harm of its corresponding blackmail
proposal because B(c) gives H twenty-four hours before harm will be inflicted, whereas M-B(c)1 gives
H, in effect, no time at all: A demands immediate payment, and threatens to issue B(c) immediately
upon noncompliance.
53. Christopher’s elaboration of the substantivist approach, see id. at 777–79, suggests that he might
resist this contention. He might argue that the disclosure threatened by M-B(c)1 is more remote than the
disclosure threatened by B(c) by the amount of time it takes to utter B(c), and is also more indirect
because the utterance of B(c) constitutes an additional intervening step. This is strictly true, but to call it
a quibble would be to overstate its importance. By that reasoning, the threat “I will punch you in the
nose at the count of ten” threatens more remote harm than does the threat “I will punch you in the nose
at the count of nine” because the feared punch will occur later in time. For that matter, the harm
threatened in the first case is more indirect as well, because “it requires an additional step,” id. at 779,
of uttering the number ten. Well, perhaps so. But surely Christopher does not suppose his readers would
find compelling the intuition that the latter threat should be treated less severely by law. This reveals
that, in order for the intuition that undergirds the substantivist perspective to be deemed compelling, it
must be construed to exclude de minimis differences of remoteness, directness, and attenuation.
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manifest the factual relationship that the substantivist intuition contemplates,
and the substantivist conclusion seems compelling as a consequence. As robbery is to extortion, we might reason, so too is M-B(c)2 to B(c).54
One might think that reimagining the meta-blackmail proposal as M-B(c)2
creates the conflict between the substantivist and functionalist conclusions that
Christopher needs for his argument to prevail and that M-B(c)1 denied him. Not
so. Rather, the prospect of M-B(c)2 shows that the factual premise needed to
support a categorical endorsement of the functionalist conclusion is false. So
our provisional endorsement of the functionalist approach was, when unquali-

54. In his Surreply, Christopher objects that M-B(c)2 is not a true meta-blackmail proposal corresponding to B(c). Whereas he had “defined a pair of blackmail and meta-blackmail proposals as corresponding if the ‘only difference between the two proposals is the threatened act,’” Russell L. Christopher, The
Trilemma of Meta-Blackmail: Is Conditionally Threatening Blackmail Worse, the Same, or Better than
Blackmail Itself?, 94 GEO. L.J. 813, 822–23 (2006) [hereinafter Surreply], the pair M-B(c)2 and B(c)
“not only differ as to the threatened act, but also differ as to when the threatened act is threatened to be
carried out.” Id.
Admittedly, I did not adhere precisely to this definition. But that is because the definition does not
work. Christopher defines a meta-blackmail proposal as a proposal that threatens blackmail. Christopher, supra note 2, at 746. And he contends that a given meta-blackmail proposal corresponds to a
given blackmail proposal if the only difference between the two proposals is the threatened act.
Consider then the pair of proposals that Christopher claims do represent a blackmail proposal and its
corresponding meta-blackmail proposal: “If you do not give me $1000, then I will disclose your
embarrassing secret” and “If you do not give me $1000, then I will blackmail you.” Surreply, supra, at
823. Call the former proposal B(rc) and the latter M-B(rc). Is M-B(rc) really a meta-blackmail proposal
that corresponds to B(rc)? Not necessarily. Suppose that B(rc) is the conditional threat to reveal the
embarrassing secret that you are engaged in an extramarital affair, and that M-B(rc) is the conditional
threat to issue a conditional threat to reveal the embarrassing secret that you chew with your mouth
open. Surely Christopher would not affirm that this particular meta-blackmail proposal corresponds to
this particular blackmail proposal, and yet they do satisfy his definition.
Precisely because Christopher’s discussion of corresponding blackmail and meta-blackmail proposals
was overly schematic and because his proposed definition was infirm, I sought, in B(c), M-B(c)1, and
M-B(c)2, to provide examples with detail sufficient for readers to assess whether the minor premises of
the formalist, functionalist, and substantive arguments were sound—to assess, in other words, whether
a given meta-blackmail proposal is likely to be more serious than, equivalent to, or less serious than its
corresponding blackmail proposal. M-B(c)2 in particular was designed to illustrate (as I thought might
not be obvious from Christopher’s own discussion) that a conditional threat to conditionally threaten X
can be more remote and attenuated than the simple conditional threat to X. If Christopher prefers to
withhold the “meta-blackmail” label from that pair, that is his prerogative. But his assertion that my use
of M-B(c)2 reflects a “fundamental misunderstanding” is hard to take seriously.
Consider this proposed formal definition of a “corresponding meta-blackmail” proposal: For two
conditional proposals, B and MB, MB is a meta-blackmail proposal that corresponds to B if and only if
B is itself a blackmail proposal of the form ⬃y iff x, and MB is a conditional threat of the form ⬃B iff
x. Working with this definition, I agree that M-B(c)2 is not a corresponding blackmail proposal of B(c).
But the point that I aimed to make with that pair can be made with a slight revision. Let B(c)* be the
following proposal: “If you do not give me $1000 within one year from today, I will at that time
disclose your adultery to your spouse.” Let M-B(c)2* be this: “If you do not give me $1000 within one
year from today, I will at that time threaten B(c)*.” By this friendly revision to Christopher’s definition
of corresponding blackmail and meta-blackmail proposals, M-B(c)2* is a meta-blackmail proposal
corresponding to B(c)*. Furthermore, the harm that M-B(c)2* threatens is nontrivially more remote and
unlikely than the harm that B(c)* threatens. Therefore, as between this pair of proposals, the substantivist minor premise holds and the functionalist minor premise does not, thereby supporting the substantivist conclusion and not the functionalist one.
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fied, premature. The very same considerations that drive us to think that the law
should treat M-B(c)2 less severely than B(c)—that the harm threatened by
M-B(c)2 is more remote, hence less likely to occur—necessarily entail that
M-B(c)2 and B(c) are not “functionally equivalent.” Christopher rightly observes that “the functionalist approach views [the two proposals] from the
perspective of their function or effect.”55 But insofar as “the harm of metablackmail . . . is of greater uncertainty and lower probability than conventional
blackmail,”56 then it will predictably cause its victim less anxiety, hence is not
equivalent in function or effect.
An unfortunate ambiguity in Christopher’s analysis now emerges. He is right
that, for any given pair consisting of a particular blackmail proposal and a
particular corresponding meta-blackmail proposal, there exist only three possibilities: the latter should be treated more severely, the same, or less severely
than the former. It does not follow, however, that there exist only three possible
ways for the law to treat the class of blackmail proposals relative to the class of
their corresponding meta-blackmail proposals. There are, to start, the three
possibilities that every meta-blackmail proposal should be treated (1) more
severely than its corresponding blackmail proposal, (2) the same as its corresponding blackmail proposal, or (3) less severely than its corresponding blackmail proposal. But there are four more: (4) some meta-blackmail proposals
should be treated more severely than their corresponding blackmail proposal,
and some should be treated the same; (5) some meta-blackmail proposals should
be treated more severely than their corresponding blackmail proposal, and some
should be treated less severely; (6) some meta-blackmail proposals should be
treated less severely than their corresponding blackmail proposal, and some
should be treated the same; and (7) some meta-blackmail proposals should be
treated more severely than their corresponding blackmail proposal, some should
be treated less severely, and some should be treated the same.
Together, the cases of B(c) and M-B(c)1 constitute a concrete example in
which a meta-blackmail proposal is functionally equivalent to its corresponding
blackmail proposal and thus should be treated the same. Meanwhile, the paired
case of B(c) and M-B(c)2 illustrates a meta-blackmail proposal that threatens
more remote harm than its corresponding blackmail proposal and should, as a
consequence, be treated less severely.57 We can therefore rule out possibilities

55. Christopher, supra note 2, at 774.
56. Id. at 779.
57. Consider too M-B(c)3: A conditionally threatens H that unless H immediately pays A $1000, A
will immediately threaten that unless H pays A $10,000 within twenty-four hours, A will, at the earliest
opportunity thereafter, disclose the fact of H’s infidelity to H’s spouse, W. This meta-blackmail proposal
is also less serious than the blackmail proposal it threatens because it permits H to escape the harm of
disclosure more cheaply.
It is tempting to suppose that if a meta-blackmail proposal can be rendered less serious than the
blackmail proposal it threatens just by demanding less money than the blackmail proposal demands,
meta-blackmail can be rendered more serious by demanding more than its threatened blackmail
proposal. In fact, though, our taste for symmetry will be disappointed. Were A to conditionally threaten
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(1) through (5): At least in principle, some meta-blackmail proposals should be
treated the same as the blackmail proposals they threaten, and some should be
treated less severely. It remains to determine whether meta-blackmail should
sometimes be treated more severely than its corresponding blackmail proposal,
in which case possibility (7) demands our endorsement, or whether we are left
with possibility (6) instead.
C. A BRONX CHEER FOR THE FORMALIST PERSPECTIVE

The reason the categorical forms of the functionalist and substantivist conclusions fail is because neither minor premise is categorically true. Some conditional threats to make a blackmail proposal are functionally equivalent to the
threatened blackmail proposal and therefore do not threaten more remote,
indirect, or attenuated harm. Conversely, some conditional threats to blackmail
do threaten more remote, indirect, or attenuated harm than their corresponding
blackmail proposal, and therefore are not functionally equivalent. But the minor
premise of the formalist argument is categorically true.58 If blackmail is defined
as some unlawful subset of conditional threats to do something lawful, then the
minor premise of the formalist argument is true by definition.
Unfortunately for Christopher, that is not quite good enough to justify the
formalist conclusion, for the formalist argument is invalid. Thanks to that
pesky ceteris paribus clause, the formalist intuition combined with the facts
that blackmail is unlawful and that the act blackmail threatens is lawful do
not jointly entail the formalist conclusion that meta-blackmail is always
more severe than blackmail.59 For the formalist argument to be valid,
Christopher needs the additional premise (2a) that all else is equal.60 He

to issue the blackmail proposal B(c) unless paid, say, $100,000, then H’s obvious course is to refuse the
demand. The meta-blackmail threat is a one-way ratchet: it can ameliorate the seriousness of the
blackmail threat it threatens, but cannot exacerbate it.
58. At least the premise is true when the intuition is given its primary meaning of turning on the
lawfulness and unlawfulness of actions. As the presentation of the formalist argument in the chart
reveals, Christopher gives that argument a secondary meaning as well—a meaning that is, in fact,
nonformalist, id. at 775–76—in which the predicates are more and less serious rather than unlawful and
lawful. I will assume arguendo that the act meta-blackmail threatens (blackmail) is “more serious” than
the act blackmail threatens (e.g., disclosure). See supra note 33.
59. For the same reason, the substantivist argument is invalid too. But in light of the more glaring
falsity of the substantivist minor premise, we did not have to examine possible problems raised by the
ceteris paribus clause.
60. Christopher cannot escape the problem by deleting the ceteris paribus requirement because then
the formalist intuition would no longer be plausible, let alone compelling. Lots of conduct that the law
permits is more dangerous, antisocial, and worthy of moral condemnation than conduct that the law
forbids. Compare, for example, the refusal of an Olympic swimmer to rescue a drowning child even
though he is aware of the child’s peril and knows that a rescue could be effectuated at virtually no cost
or inconvenience with the feeding of an expired parking meter. The former is lawful in most
jurisdictions, while the latter is often unlawful. But it hardly follows that the conditional threat to feed
the meter is “more serious” and should be treated more severely than, the conditional threat not to
undertake the easy rescue. By any reasonable standard of seriousness, the conditional threat not to
rescue is the more serious, and it would be perfectly sensible for the law to punish it more severely. Yet
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needs it, but is not entitled to it.
Ceteris paribus clauses are tricky beasts; they can mean many things. As used
in the formalist intuition, the clause appears intended to set out a law-like claim:
if the only difference between act X and act Y is that X is unlawful whereas Y is
lawful, then it is always true that the threat to X is more serious than the threat
to Y. But the requirement of all else being equal will presumably never be
satisfied in this context because a difference in legal treatment is not foundational; there should always be differences—meaningful differences—between X
and Y that explain or justify the facts that X, but not Y, is made unlawful. So if
the formalist argument is given its formalist construction, then the ceteris
paribus requirement is not satisfied, and the conclusion does not follow. Furthermore, Christopher is no more entitled to premise (2a) when the nonformalist
variant of the formalist intuition is relied on. Even assuming that the act
meta-blackmail threatens is more serious than the act blackmail threatens, that
is not the only difference between the two. Because what meta-blackmail
threatens is itself a conditional threat whereas what blackmail threatens is an act
that is not itself a threat, ceteris is not paribus.
As such, Christopher’s formalist argument runs into a fatal obstacle if
ceteris paribus is given its strict (or strong) meaning. However there is a
softer or weaker version of ceteris paribus in which it is essentially synonymous with “ordinarily” or “presumptively” and functions as a burdenshifting device.61 When ceteris paribus is employed in this way, one who
would avoid the force of the premise in a given case must provide reasons
why the customary relationship or conclusion does not obtain. But even if
we allow Christopher this weak version of ceteris paribus, our analyses of
the functionalist and substantivist arguments provide us with all we need to
shoulder that burden.
A prerequisite to it being the case that a conditional threat to X is more
serious than (or should be treated more severely than) a conditional threat to Y
is that the two conditional threats are not functionally equivalent. But as
Christopher cogently explains,62 that condition can fail when X is itself a
conditional threat to Y. Under those circumstances, the two conditional threats
can collapse into one so that the conditional threat to X ⫽ the conditional threat
to conditionally threaten to Y N the conditional threat to Y. It seems, therefore,
that whenever X itself is a conditional threat to Y, then a conditional threat to X
such a law could comfortably coexist with a continued refusal to criminalize the simple (unconditional)
failure to undertake easy rescues. The decision not to impose a general duty to rescue might be justified,
for example, by a fear that some bystanders who were genuinely unaware of the peril might be wrongly
prosecuted and even convicted—a worry that disappears when the potential rescuer issues his conditional proposal thereby evidencing his awareness of the peril. As this example demonstrates, the
formalist intuition cannot stand without the qualification that the ceteris paribus clause aims to supply.
61. Cf. John R. Searle, How To Derive “Ought” from “Is,” in READINGS IN ETHICAL THEORY 63,
65–66 (Wilfrid Sellars & John Hospers eds., 2d ed. 1970) (“[U]nless we have some reason to the
contrary, the ceteris paribus condition is satisfied . . . .”).
62. Christopher, supra note 2, at 775.
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(call such a threat Z) has the capacity to be functionally equivalent to a
conditional threat to Y. In that event, the conditional threat to X cannot be more
serious than the conditional threat to Y, i.e., Z cannot be more serious than X.
I have said that a conditional threat to X has the capacity to be functionally equivalent to X itself where X is a conditional threat. Our discussion of
the substantivist argument prevented me from saying that, in such a case, the
conditional threat to X necessarily is functionally equivalent to X: When Z
threatens the prospect of X at some distant remove, then the anchoring harm
that X and Z alike threaten—Y—is more remote and less probable from the
perspective of Z than from the perspective of X, rendering Z less serious
than X. At the same time, a conditional threat to X cannot speed up the
prospect of the harm that X threatens and cannot thereby become more
serious.63
In short, I have provided reasons why, in the unusual circumstances where
the unlawful (or more serious) act conditionally threatened, X, is itself a
conditional threat to perform the lawful (or less serious) act, Y, the conditional
threat to X is not more serious than the conditional threat to Y. In some such
cases, the conditional threat to X can be functionally equivalent to X itself. In
other cases, the conditional threat to X is less serious (under plausible understandings of seriousness) than X. In neither event would it be at all sensible to punish
the conditional threat to X more severely. The formalist intuition is sound. But
in the case of meta-blackmail, we can give reasons, as the ceteris paribus clause
demands, why the usual conclusion should not obtain.
CONCLUSION
Think of meta-blackmail as a parlor game. Here is the challenge: Can we
resolve the conflict between competing conclusions regarding how the law
should treat conditional threats to conditionally threaten without having to
abandon the intuitions or premises upon which those conclusions are said to
rest? I have endeavored to show that we can. As a result, the meta-blackmail
device does not support Christopher’s conclusion that blackmail should be
decriminalized. Instead, it leaves the blackmail puzzle just as Christopher found
it. And how he found it, quite possibly, was “solved.”64
63. See also supra note 57 (explaining why, in other respects as well, a meta-blackmail proposal
could be less serious than the blackmail proposal it threatens, but not more serious).
64. In his Surreply, Christopher observes that this Reply does not engage every argument in
Meta-Blackmail. That is true: space constraints required that I concentrate on the core of Christopher’s
argument. For the same reason, I cannot offer a point-by-point rebuttal of his Surreply. Instead, I will
briefly address those arguments that most clearly exhibit Christopher’s failure to grasp the central
reason why meta-blackmail presents no trilemma. That failure reveals itself most plainly in Part II of
Christopher’s Surreply, where he contends that I “largely ignor[e]” his arguments designed to show that
meta-blackmail can be less serious than its corresponding blackmail proposal, Surreply, supra note 54,
at 822, and that I “assume that the only measure by which a threatened harm may be more remote,
indirect, and attenuated is temporal.” Id. at 826. I think that both charges are mistaken.
Far from denying that meta-blackmail can be less serious than its corresponding blackmail proposal,
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I offered concrete examples designed to show this is so. (Although Russell quibbles, fairly, with my
discussion of M-B(c)2, I have now revised the example to meet his objection. See supra note 54.)
Furthermore, while I believe that temporal remoteness illustrates this point most effectively, I agree that
the substantivist conclusion follows for any corresponding pair of blackmail and meta-blackmail
proposals insofar as the harm that they alike threaten is less likely to occur, or likely to occur at a
greater temporal remove, in the latter case than the former. (In my view, “indirectness” is a proxy for
either or both of these factors but lacks independent significance. I confess not to have a clear idea of
what “attenuated” is meant to capture beyond remote and unlikely.) But I also believe that nontrivial
differences in remoteness and probability (and indirectness and attenuatedness as well, if it matters)
will be rare. Here is where Christopher and I do appear to differ. Whereas he contends that “[t]he harm
of a threat to threaten is generally more remote, indirect, and attenuated than the harm of a threat,” id.
at 825 (emphasis added), I think that, when the “threat to threaten” and the “threat” are, respectively, a
meta-blackmail proposal and the blackmail proposal to which it corresponds, the exceptions to this
generality are likely to swallow the rule. This disagreement is not easily resolved, but it also does not
matter. Anyone who agrees with Christopher on this issue should feel free to reverse my orderings by
awarding two cheers to the substantivist solution and only one to the functionalist.
The critical point is that whenever meta-blackmail threatens a more remote or less probable harm
than does the simple blackmail proposal to which it corresponds (however rare or common that may
be), the substantivist minor premise obtains and the functionalist minor premise does not. One proposal
cannot both threaten more remote or less probable harm than another and be fully equivalent to the
other from the perspective of function or effect. Put in Christopher’s terms, either “the lower certainty
and probability of the harm of meta-blackmail constitutes a qualitatively significant, non de minimis,
difference between meta-blackmail and [its corresponding blackmail proposal],” id. at 827, in which
case the proposals are not functionally equivalent, or the differences in probability and remoteness are
de minimis in which case the proposals are functionally equivalent. Both cannot be true, so there is no
incompatibility between the functionalist and substantivist perspectives. Although both intuitions are
sound, they do not yield conflicting conclusions regarding the proper treatment of any given corresponding pair of blackmail and meta-blackmail proposals. Nothing in Christopher’s Surreply addresses this
central and seemingly decisive objection.
Do matters differ when we turn attention to the formalist perspective? Nestled among what I view as
several distractions in Part I of the Surreply lies a sound and important objection. Although Christopher
does not put the challenge in quite these terms, its thrust is to deny my assertion that “[a] prerequisite to
it being the case that a conditional threat to X is more serious than (or should be treated more severely
than) a conditional threat to Y is that the two conditional threats are not functionally equivalent.” Id. at
818. This claim was indeed too strong. As Christopher’s apt contrast between killing and letting die
demonstrates, the law and conventional morality sometimes do assess functionally equivalent acts to be
of differential seriousness.
So I should not have suggested that function or effect is the only basis upon which seriousness can be
measured for purposes of the criminal law. Unfortunately, despite his repeated references to the
“seriousness” of corresponding proposals, Christopher does not tell us what the criminal-law-relevant
criteria of seriousness are. The most likely candidates, I suppose, are blameworthiness and wrongfulness. Accordingly, Christopher is free to argue that, notwithstanding the fact that a meta-blackmail
proposal is functionally equivalent to its corresponding blackmail proposal and therefore cannot be
more serious by virtue of its effects, it is more “serious” all things considered because, for example, the
person who engages in meta-blackmail is more blameworthy than one who engages in blackmail or
because meta-blackmail violates a more stringent deontic command.
I am highly skeptical that even remotely persuasive arguments of this sort can be advanced. (Recall
Christopher’s ruminations about why the recipient of a meta-blackmail proposal is likely not to be
especially concerned. Id. at 826–27. Are we really supposed to accept that the meta-blackmail proposal
is meaningfully less anxiety-provoking than its corresponding blackmail proposal but that, nonetheless,
its issuance is more blameworthy or more wrongful?) But I need not insist upon this view, because even
were Christopher to adduce such arguments, that would not save his thesis.
Let us suppose that, for whatever reason, a meta-blackmail proposal that is functionally equivalent to
its corresponding blackmail proposal is, all things considered, more “serious” in criminal-law-relevant
respects. (Although I have suggested that this can be true only if the meta-blackmail proposal is more
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wrongful or is apt to be undertaken by a more blameworthy actor, my analysis holds true for whatever
standards of “seriousness” Christopher might want.) Would this create a dilemma between the formalist
and functionalist perspectives? Not at all. It would simply require that the functionalist intuition (see
supra chart accompanying notes 46–49) be qualified to include a ceteris paribus clause. Or, in lieu of
that, and at somewhat greater precision, the functionalist intuition (or major premise, as I prefer to think
of it) can be rewritten thus: “Functionally equivalent proposals should be treated equivalently, except if
the proposals differ on the balance of criminal-law-relevant criteria of seriousness.” That a modification
along these lines would be necessary should not be surprising: revision to the functionalist major
premise is demanded for the very same reason that rendered inadequate my assertion that “[a]
prerequisite to its being the case that a conditional threat to X is more serious than (or should be treated
more severely than) a conditional threat to Y is that the two conditional threats are not functionally
equivalent.” That statement of mine, and the unqualified form of the functionalist intuition, stand or fall
together.
By now, you should know what follows. Christopher can stick to his guns that some (even all!)
meta-blackmail proposals are more “serious” than their corresponding blackmail proposals, but only at
the cost of abandoning the functionalist conclusion that the fact they are functionally equivalent
necessarily justifies equivalence of treatment. That is, the functionalist conclusion that a pair of
corresponding meta-blackmail and blackmail proposals should be treated the same will not follow
merely from the premise that the two proposals are functionally equivalent. It must be established as
well that the corresponding proposals do not differ on the balance of criminal-law-relevant criteria of
seriousness. But if that additional premise is true, then the formalist conclusion is not. So once the
functionalist intuition is suitably qualified, then the functionalist argument stands in essentially the
same relation to the formalist argument as it does to the substantivist one.
The bottom line is that the formalist, functionalist, and substantivist perspectives do not yield “jointly
incompatible,” Christopher, supra note 2, at 747, conclusions regarding the proper legal treatment of
any given pair of corresponding meta-blackmail and blackmail proposals. There is no trilemma.

